Characteristics of China’s air transport industry by Zhang, Yahua (Shane) et al.
1 
 
An overview of China’s recent domestic and international air transport policy 
Abstract 
This chapter reviews China’s domestic and international air transport policy. The introduction 
of private and low-cost carriers, together with the emergence of HSR, put much competitive 
pressure on the Chinese state-owned carriers and create momentum for further reforms in 
China’s air transport sector. In the last two decades, relatively liberal air services 
arrangements have been made with some major markets including the US, ASEAN, Korea, 
Japan etc. These open and liberal arraignments have given the Chinese carriers the room to 
grow and the chance to become stronger. They in turn call for further liberalisation moves to 
allow for their deeper participation in and engagement with international air transport service 
provisions. 
 
1. Overview of China’s economic growth and air transport industry 
Air travel and economic growth have an intertwined relationship. On the one hand, the 
demand for air travel depends heavily on economic conditions, resulting in the fact that the 
air transport industry is extremely cyclical in demand. On the other hand, it is a widely held 
view that as an input into many economic activities including tourism, trade and investment, 
air transport has been an important component in achieving economic development and 
welfare enhancement (Zhang and Findlay 2014). Air transport is particularly important to 
distant and remote regions where there is no close substitute for this transport mode due to 
the tyranny of distance. In some parts of the world, air transport is the only viable means of 
transportation for both goods and people due to geographic or climate constraints (Pagliari 
2010). This co-relationship is best reflected by leisure travel, which heavily relies on the 
increase in disposable income, while at the same time, air transport can substantially 
contribute to a country’s tourism by bringing in tourists and revenues, thereby increasing 
local residents’ disposable income. 
China has been the second largest aviation market in the world in terms of the volumes of 
passengers and air cargo moved in its domestic market since 2007. In 2018 the whole 
industry handled 611.7 million passengers and 7.4 million tonnes of air cargo, representing 
10.9% and 4.6% increases from the previous year, respectively. China’s airline market is a 
growing market underpinned by a huge population and rapid economic growth. IATA 
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forecasts that China will overtake the United States (US) as the largest air passenger market 
in the mid-2020s measured by traffic to, from and within a country. It is believed that the 
growth in China and other Asian economies including India, Indonesia and Thailand will 
shift the centre of gravity of the air transport industry from the west hemisphere to Asia in the 
next two decades.  
Figures 1 and 2 depict the passengers and cargo carried by China’s air transport sector from 
2009 to 2018. The growth rates for both passenger and cargo markets were remarkable 
immediately after the economy recovered from the hit of the global financial crisis.  In recent 
years, the growth rates for both markets were quite stable.  The passenger market performed 
particularly well, recording a two-digit growth, even though the GDP growth rate was only 
around 7% in the last few years. 
 
Figure 1 Number of passengers handled by China’s airline industry 2009-2018 
Source: CAAC 
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Figure 3 China’s GDP growth 2009-2018 
2. The development of China’s domestic air transport policy in the new century  
2.1 Deregulation and privatisation  
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Zhang and Zhang (2016) note that unlike the USA and EU, where the Deregulation 
Act and three legislative liberalisation packages, respectively, paved the way for 
airline deregulation, there was no formal legislation in China to guide the deregulation 
process. Most of the deregulation measures were issued by CAAC in the form of ‘rules’ 
and ‘guidelines’, which could be reversible when some unintended consequences 
arose.  This is evidenced by the fact that although there was an informal relaxation of the 
Chinese government’s control of airfares in 1997, in the following years CAAC attempted 
many times to re-regulate the fares after they saw continuous price wars in the domestic 
markets.  The final resort to avoid strong competition among state-owned carriers was to 
guide them into consolidations in October 2002 and crated China’s big three: the Air China 
Group, the China Eastern Group and the China Southern Group. These consolidations 
mergers faced no antitrust challenge at that time due to the absence of any effective 
antitrust laws. Other significant and influential mergers supported by the government 
include the China Eastern-Shanghai Airlines merger in 2009 and the takeover of Shenzhen 
Airlines by Air China in 2010. 
However, it appeared that the 2002 airline consolidations did not effectively lesson 
competition or confer the three airline groups with any significant market power in both short 
and longer term as revealed in Zhang and Round (2009) and Zhang (2015), largely owing to 
the implementation of other forms of deregulation in the following years, including the 
relaxation of entry to and exit from markets, and the introduction of low cost carriers (LCCs), 
which put significant competitive pressure on China’s state-owned carriers (Zhang and 
Zhang, 2016, 2017). In particular, competition in the markets associated with Beijing, 
Guangzhou and Shanghai remained strong, and almost all new and existing airlines wish to 
launch services to these markets. As a result, airlines had a strong incentive to lobby CAAC 
to impose restrictions on market access to some of these markets, especially the routes 
linking Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, which are still heavily regulated today. In contrast, 
for other airline routes, prior approval for entry and exit is no longer required (Zhang and 
Round, 2008).  
Apart from supporting airline consolidations, CAAC promulgated ‘The Scheme of Domestic 
Airfare Reform’ and set a price ceiling and a price floor for the domestic airfares in 2014 to 
defer price wars. However, in practice, the price floor limit was largely disregarded and 
competition in prices remained strong as the state-owned airlines except a few routes such as 
Beijing-Shanghai and Shanghai-Guangzhou where tacit collusion was quite successful 
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(Zhang and Round, 2011, Ma et al., 2019).  The restrictions on airline pricing were formally 
abolished in 2013. Although they were not effectively enforced for many years, the formal 
removal of these pricing regulation reflects CAAC’s positive attitude towards the market 
mechanism and the idea of air transport liberalisation.  
The release of the ‘Regulation on Domestic Investment on Civil Aviation’ in 2004 allowed 
private sector’s participation in the civil aviation industry and led to the establishment of  
China’s first batch of private airlines in 2005 including Okay Airways in Tianjin, United 
Eagle Airlines in Chengdu and Spring Airlines in Shanghai. Spring Airlines positioned itself 
as an LCC and was publicly listed in 2015. Today it is the largest private carrier and also the 
largest LCC in China. The number of private carriers quickly mushroomed and by 2007 and 
this number reached 20. This put a strong challenge to the state-owned carriers and raised 
security and safety concerns.  CAAC then decided to suspend approval of new domestic 
entrants until 2010. Following the crash of an aircraft of a local airline in 2010 (Yichun 
aircraft crash’ as shown in Figure 4 below), the government extended the suspension policy 
until 2013. Subsequently, another wave of private airlines emerged in 2013 and 2014. 
It is argued that 2014 is the banner year for the Chinese LCC industry because of the release 
of the ‘Guiding Opinions on Promoting Low Cost Aviation Industry Development’ by 
CAAC. For the first time, the aviation authorities acknowledged the significant role played 
by LCCs in the nation’s economy. From 2013 to 2014, there was another wave of private 
airlines established in China. Some of the existing carriers rebranded themselves as LCCs 
during this period including China United Airlines (see Table 1). At the end of 2018 there 
were 45 state-owned airlines and 15 private airlines. Among the 60 carriers, 9 of them were 
all cargo carriers and 8 were publicly listed. Ten carriers had foreign equities.  The chequered 
deregulation in China’s private aviation is shown in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4: The chequered development journey of China’s private airlines, 2003–14. 
 
Source: The chart was modified based on Xia (2014). (GFC for ‘global financial crisis’.) 
Some of the private airlines established in the first wave around 2005 quickly failed due to the 
lack of experienced pilots and skilled personnel, and the high costs and taxes associated with 
aircraft procurement, jet fuel and airport charges (Zhang and Lu, 2013). However, the most 
serious obstacles that stifled the growth of China’s private and LCCs are the hostile aviation 
policy. In most cases, the state-owned airlines could exercise a significant influence on the 




























CAAC’s decision. Any aviation reforms and new aviation policy would put the interests of the 
state-owned airlines first (Zhang and Zhang, 2016, 2017).  For example, for a long time, airport 
slot allocation in China has been a closed-door deal that favoured the state-owned airlines. 
When the Shanghai-based Spring and Juneyao were granted the right to fly between Shanghai 
and Beijing, they were only given a departure time from Shanghai at late night and from Beijing 
at early morning, almost the last two flights from Shanghai to Beijing and earliest ones from 
Beijing to Shanghai. The big three operated about 50 flights every day while these two private 
carriers only operated one flight each.  Being unable to attract many passengers, Spring 
suspended its service on this route for some time and did not return until recently.    
Yu et al. (2019) compared the operating efficiency performance between Chinese and India 
carriers. They found that China’s three state-owned airlines performed poorly in both the 
capacity generation and service stages, particularly the latter. In contrast, the private LCC, 
Spring was one of the most efficient carriers during the period between 2005 and 2015. They 
confirm that the LCC model and private ownership are significantly associated with better 
airline efficiency performance. Interestingly, the state-owned Air India is much more efficient 
than its Chinese counterparts, probably indicating that state-owned airlines operating in an 
environment dominated by private and LCCs tend to become stronger in efficiency. Therefore, 
there is a need to formulate supportive policies towards LCCs and private carriers in China. In 
2018, China further eased investment access to aviation industry, allowing private capital to 
account for more than 50% of their equity as long as the government remains to be the largest 
single shareholder. This move will likely improve the efficiency of the state-owned carriers.  
2.2 Evolution of China’s airport connectivity  
The concept of connectivity in air transport was first introduced to evaluate the importance of 
an airport in terms of its connection to other airports (Zhu, et al., 2018). .Zhang et al. (2017), 
Zhu et al. (2018a), and Zhu et al. (2019b) have developed a connectivity measure to quantify 
an airport or a city’s connections with other cities or countries. This measure not only considers 
the quantity indicators such as the number of seats, but also the travel quality indicators such 
as travel time, aircraft type, etc. This kind of measure can be used to evaluate the role of an 
airport in the existing air transport network, helping detect weak points and seek ways to 
improve the reliability and accessibility of the network to reduce travel time and costs (Hadas 
et al., 2017). Table 2 list the air connectivity scores for the top 20 airports in China in selected 
years from 2006 to 2016. Note that like consumer price index, these connectivity scores are 
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unitless and only meaningful when they are used to compare the level of connectivity across 
airports or over time. It can be seen that Chinese airports achieved tremendously success in 
increasing their connectivity from 2006 to 2016. The increase is particularly impressively in 
secondary tier cities (Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou are normally regarded as the first tier 
cities and most provincial capital cities are the second tier). 
Table 2 Airport connectivity 2006-2016  
Airports Y2006 Y2008 Y2010 Y2012 Y2014 Y2016 
Beijing Capital 5943 6608 7243 7909 8489 8762 
Guangzhou 3395 4032 4607 5219 5746 6095 
Shanghai Pudong 3236 3529 3849 4292 4721 5693 
Kunming 1845 2194 2730 2957 4001 4805 
Shenzhen 2335 2669 3192 3497 4296 4729 
Chengdu 2247 2333 2945 3406 3868 4585 
Xi'an 1257 1392 2240 2977 3609 4116 
Shanghai 
Hongqiao 
2281 2670 3232 3619 3907 3980 
Chongqing 1119 1522 2034 2746 3339 3800 
Hangzhou 1302 1683 2045 2362 2960 3565 
Urumqi 769 845 1499 2079 2508 3071 
Xiamen 997 1279 1734 2260 2789 2965 
Harbin 583 890 1130 1380 1909 2508 
Nanjing 742 1185 1554 1769 1900 2484 
Zhengzhou 576 797 1170 1392 2043 2392 
Qingdao 918 1084 1440 1685 2032 2370 
Changsha 851 1150 1583 1818 2063 2320 
Shenyang 789 1030 1226 1436 1822 2225 
Wuhan 724 1081 1368 1578 1930 2200 
Dalian 767 980 1383 1508 1847 2157 
Source: Zhang et al. (2017). 
Table 3 reports the major Chinese carriers’ link connectivity at the domestic market level, 
which is the aggregation of their route-level connectivity.  From 2007 to 2017, the connectivity 
of the big four carriers more than doubled in the domestic market, suggesting that China is a 
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growth market. The performance of Spring Airlines, an LCC, experienced a 23-fold increase 
in the domestic market, which is remarkable. However, compared with the big three, Spring is 
still small in scale given its connectivity was only 13% of China Southern’ in 2017.   









2007 121576 83425 71628 39800 1113 
2009 140861 105151 86904 45442 7296 
2011 152786 118108 96091 46769 13349 
2013 174343 140976 106542 60453 18460 
2015 193412 160837 115796 64430 20276 
2017 200750 179384 126263 80379 25963 
Source: The calculation was based on IATA AirportIS’ historical schedule data. 
2.3 The impact of high-speed rail (HSR) 
In the last decade, high speed rail (HSR) has emerged as a significant transport mode in China, 
posing a serious threat the China’s air transport sector (Zhu et al., 2019b). In 2018 the length 
of China’s HSR track amounted to 27 684 km, representing the largest HSR network (64% of 
the total) in the world.  According to the updated ‘Medium-to-Long-Term Railway Network 
Plan’ report covering the period 2016–25 with an outlook to 2030, China’s HSR network will 
by 2025 stretch to  38 000 km, including eight north–south and eight east–west trunk lines (Fu 
et al., 2015). By 2030 China’s HSR network will reach 45 000 km in length, and most cities 
with a population of 500,000 or more will be connected by HSR.  In fact, under China's recent 
expansion plan, by 2025 about 80% of its domestic airline routes are to be overlapped with 
HSR lines (Zhang et al., 2019). 
The spread of HSR network has forced Chinese airlines to cut domestic airfares and reduce or 
cancel flights (Zhang et al., 2019). Zhang and Zhang (2016) show that the presence of HSR 
services would significantly reduce the bilateral air passenger flows by 53%. In fact, in 
extreme cases air services could be suspended as a result of the launch of HSR service: 48 
days after the opening of the HSR between Zhengzhou and Xi’an,  all the flights between the 
two cities were cancelled;  in the same year and for the same  reason, airlines withdrew from 
the Wuhan–Nanjing and Wuhan–Nanchang routes; Wuhan Tianhe Airport recorded its first 
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negative growth (-8.52%) in air passenger throughput during the Chinese New Year holiday 
in 2011 due to the impact of the opening of Guangzhou–Wuhan HSR.  Quite consistent 
results are reported in Chen (2017) who investigated the air-HSR competition on the Wuhan-
Guangzhou and Beijing-Shanghai routes and found a significant drop in air traffic, flight 
frequency and seat capacity as a result of the introduction of parallel HSR services. 
Specifically, the author reports a drop in domestic passengers by 28.2%, in flight number by 
24.6% and in seat capacity by 27.9% after the introduction of HSR services. The negative 
impacts on air service are the greatest on the routes with a distance between 500 and 800 km. 
When the Guangzhou-Wuhan HSR opened in 2009, there was a decline of air services 
between the two cities by 45% and the fall was 33.6% when the Beijing-Shanghai HSR was 
launched. Li et al. (2019) again confirmed the strong negative impact of HSR frequency on 
air travel demand. Such negative impact of HSR is stronger in China's central and western 
regions.  
As a strong competitor to airlines, HSR is expected to put a downward pressure on airfares. 
Interestingly, however, mixed results have been produced regarding the impact of HSR on 
airfares.  Ma et al. (2018) found that before 2014, HSR did place a negative pressure on airfare 
in China’s airline market. However, from 2014, the negative impact gradually disappeared. 
The authors explained that two reasons are behind the changes. First, airlines were unlikely to 
charge higher prices immediately after the launch of HSR services, but they could develop 
strategies over time to respond to the HSR entry. Reducing frequency and capacity is one 
example. Seeking price-fixing is another possibility. Ma et al. (2019) show the entry of the 
HSR led to airfare convergence on the Beijing-Shanghai airline route, which might indicate the 
existence of tacit collusion among the operating carriers.  Second, HSR could complement the 
air services and bring in more passengers from nearby cities at both endpoints of the route. The 
Director of the CAAC announced in 2017 that some flights from second- and third-tier cities 
to Beijing would be shifted to Tianjin and Shijiazhuang with these airports being linked to 
Beijing via HSR (Zhang et al., 2017). Ma et al. (2019) pointed out that while HSR poses a 
threat to air transport, it can also be used to mitigate congestion problems at mega-airports and 
help make full use secondary airports' capacities through air-rail cooperation agreement. It is 
expected that the deepening of such cooperation would help stabilise airfares.   
In the face of a and strong and irreversible competitor, HSR,  that offer similar products, 
China’s air transport sector needs to work out new strategies and develop new policies to 
sustain the growth of this industry.  Obviously, encouraging price-fixing activities is no 
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longer a choice as it is illegal to do so under the 2008 Anti-Monopoly Law, although explicit 
price collusion was a common practice in China’s aviation market.  For example, after the 
control over airfares was relaxed in 1997, CAAC constantly sought to re-regulate airfares to 
avoid price wars and industry losses by putting a limit on the maximum discounts (Zhang and 
Zhang, 2017), including introducing ‘revenue pooling’ program and supporting airline 
consolidations to restrict competition from the late 1990s to the early 2000s (Zhang and 
Round, 2008). With the introduction of the anti-trust law and the HSR services, Chinese 
airlines have a stronger incentive to lobby CAAC not to open heavily travelled and lucrative 
markets to new carriers. This has been the case as mentioned earlier, and can be justified at 
this stage given the fact that the airports of Beijing and Shanghai are over-congested.  
However, with the opening of the new Beijing Xiaxing Airport and the introduction of the 
third terminal in Shanghai, congestion is of a less concern, there is no legitimate reason not to 
treat the state-owned and private carriers equally. As such any market access restrictions may 
not be able to stay long.  
Zhang and Zhang (2016) pointed out that the the challenges facing China’s air 
transport sector will be greater in the near future  after the  rapidly  expanding  HSR 
network has connected most of the major cities. Therefore, Chinese airlines need to 
consider redeploying part of their capacities to international markets. This is actually 
the case for Spring Airlines that has shifted a significant part of its capacity on to the 
East Asia and Southeast Asia markets in the last few years. This implies that the 
Chinese government needs to consider embracing more liberal air services 
agreements/arraignments (ASA) including actively pursuing 'open skies' deals. This 
will be discussed in the next section.  
3. Liberalising international air transport   
3.1 Liberalisation process before 2003 
The 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation, also known an as the Chicago 
Convention, established the ICAO as the governing body for the aviation industry worldwide. 
A regulatory framework including three elements was formed to deal with the economic 
issues involving international air services: bilateral air services agreements (ASAs) for the 
control of market access; inter-airline commercial or pooling agreements; and the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) for controlling tariffs (Doganis, 2001).  A 
typical air service agreement specifies the rights to fly across borders and such rights are 
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restricted to airlines designated by the signatories. These airlines need to be owned and 
controlled by residents of the country making the designation. As a result, airlines from third 
parties are discriminated against: they either cannot fly on the routes between the countries 
involved in the bilateral agreement or they have only restricted access. Some bilateral 
agreements also restrict the capacity and frequency of the services which the designated 
airlines provide (Zhang and Findlay, 2011). 
Liberalising international air transport market has been a long, gradual and on-going process 
for China. Before 1987, CAAC was the aviation regulator as well as the commercial flight 
operator. To encourage operating efficiency and profitability, in 1987 the State Council 
ratified the ‘Report on Civil Aviation Reform Measures and Implementation’, and separated 
CAAC’s government, administrative and regulatory role from the day-to-day operations of 
commercial airlines and airports (Zhang and Round, 2008). As a result, between 1987 and 
1991 six state-owned trunk airlines based in the regional capital cities were established: Air 
China (Beijing), China Eastern (Shanghai), China Northwest(Xi’an), China 
Northern(Shenyang), China Southwest(Chengdu) and China Southern(Guangzhou). During 
this period, many local governments worked with CAAC and established their own carriers 
including Hainan Airlines, Xiamen Airlines, Sichuan Airlines, etc.  
For a long time until the new century, Air China was the only national flag carrier, and 
inherited almost all the international traffic rights from CAAC, particularly the rights to fly 
long-haul international routes to the US and Europe. It was not until 1992 when China 
Eastern was designated as a carrier flying international markets. Despite this, China Eastern’s 
international services only focused on the East Asia markets and a small number of long haul 
international routes to the US and Europe. China Southern was allowed to provide services to 
Southeast Asia from Guangzhou. Other airlines almost had no rights to fly international 
markets. With such an arrangement, the big three had little direct competition in the 
international markets. 
Although China’s air transport sector achieved rapid growth after its initial deregulation in 
the 1980s, there was still a lack of clear, coherent and well articulated policy objectives in 
terms of international air transport before 2003, result in the country’s airline industry being 
unable to develop a competitive edge compared to their counterparts in their neighbouring 
countries, let alone carriers in the US and Europe. China’s international sector ranked 16th 
measured by revenue passenger kilometres (RPK) in 2000, far behind Korea, Singapore, 
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Australia and Canada. The bad safety record in the 1990s worsened the situation. Quite often, 
on the same international route, Chinese carriers’ market share was one third of the foreign 
airlines’ (Zhang and Chen, 2003). Therefore, until the early 2000s, China’s international 
aviation policy was very conservative, mainly because CAAC wanted to protect the interests 
of its weak state-owned carriers, particularly when negotiating ASAs. Zhang and Chen 
(2003) reported that CAAC tended to impose strict restrictions on the number of designated 
airlines, routes, capacity and frequency in the ASAs. The allocation of the traffic rights was 
based on actual market shares between Chinese and foreign carries, not on the capacity 
provisions.  
3.2 The liberalisation process after 2003 
The radical shift towards a more liberalised international air transport policy came after 
China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. The Annex on Air 
Transport Service to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) under the WTO 
has noted trade rules and principles such as most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment, national 
treatment and transparency to three specific so-called ‘soft’ rights: aircraft repair and 
maintenance, selling and marketing of air transport and Computer Reservation System (CRS) 
services. The traffic rights (or hard rights) are excluded from the WTO framework. However, 
the WTO has been constantly considering the possibility of the expansion of its coverage and 
reviewed the possibility of including air transport, thereby putting much pressure on China’s 
aviation authorities to build a strong and profitable air transport sector to support economic 
development and international trade. 
In October 2003, CAAC declared that it would liberalise its international air transport sector 
with a ‘proactive, progressive, orderly and safeguarded” approach (Lei and O’Connell, 2011). 
The principle was written into the Annual Strategic Development Plan for 2004 that clearly 
stated that CAAC would support Chinese carriers to expand their international services. Lei 
et al. (2016) note that a fundamental change since 2003 was that the interests of the state-
owned carriers would no longer be the sole consideration when the government negotiated 
traffic rights with foreign countries. In 2003, an unilateral open skies arrangement was made 
in Hainan Province, giving unlimited 3rd, 4th and 5th freedom traffic rights for both Chinese 
and foreign carriers. At the end of 2018, the number of international routes of Hainan 
(including routes to/from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan) increased to 61 from 5 in 2003. 
The effect of this unilateral Open Skies policy on the tourism industry has been tremendous. 
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In 2002 Hainan Province received less than 400 000 overseas tourists and this figure had 
increased to about 1 million in 2008. Now it is well above 1 million.  
In 2004, China and the US reached a significant achievement in liberalising the bilateral 
ASA: the number of designation increased from four to nine for both sides; the designated 
carriers were allowed to access any cities of the other side; the number of flights each week 
between the two countries would increase to 249 in a phased-in matter (Lei et al., 2016). 
Further expansion of this deal was concluded in 2007 including increasing frequency and 
removing the limit on the number of designations. Lei et al. (2016) claim that the two deals in 
2004 and 2007 between China and the US have profound impacts on the China-US market, 
one of which was the gradual improvement of Chinese carriers’ operating and finance 
performance in the following years. In 2011, in the China-US market, Chinese carriers’ share 
was 38%; in 2014, this figure increased to 50%; in 2017, Chinese carriers commanded a 
share of more than 60%. A decade ago, Chinese carriers were unable to fully utilise their 
allocated traffic rights and it was the US carriers that were keen to chase for more rights. It is 
the other way around today: the Chinese carriers pushed for more liberal arrangement 
between the two countries. Therefore, it can be argued that the 2004 and 2007 protocols have 
served as big milestones in terms of shaping China’s international air transport policy. 
 Table 4 reports the number of flights of China’s big three in the China-US market from 2006 
to 2018. It can be see that Air China is the largest carrier in the market, but China Eastern has 
followed closely in recently years.  
Table 4 The number of flights (yearly) of the big three, 2006-2018 
 
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 
Air 
China 1704 1944 1936 2432 4284 5280 6032 
China 
Eastern 888 960 1200 1560 3052 4780 5072 
China 
Southern 656 628 492 672 832 2672 2632 
Source: IATA AirportIS 
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Following the success of the liberal arrangement between China and the US, an open skies 
agreement between China and ASEAN was inked in 2010, aiming to establish an unlimited 
air service arrangement (passengers and cargo) between China and ASEAN members. Since 
then, the number of flights between ASEAN and China has increased rapidly. Traditionally, 
air transport services between ASEAN and China were offered by the flag carriers, and 
between gateway cities. The open skies agreement allowed both flag and non-flag carriers to 
increase flight frequency and offer flights to many second- and third-tier cities (Law et al., 
2018). As a result, air connectivity between ASEAN and China has increased substantially. 
The number of flights operated by China’s big three between China and Thailand, and 
Singapore is shown in Table 5.  It can be seen that all the three airlines experienced 
substantial increase in capacity in the China-Thailand market. Air China recorded a decrease 
in the number of flights between China and Singapore and the other two saw moderate 
increases. Usually Singapore is a business destination while Thailand is a tourist destination. 
It seems that tourist destinations benefit most from the China-ASEAN open skies.  








Singapore  1176 904 1848 2156 1936 2632 
Thailand  2184 1504 2840 5980 12236 11680 
Air 
China  
Singapore  2568 2352 2672 2016 1968 1968 
Thailand  1244 940 884 1824 3776 5760 
China 
Eastern 
Singapore  2400 2184 3504 3688 3096 3560 
Thailand  2084 1812 4204 7128 10196 9512 
 
China is Australia’s largest trading partner in terms of both imports and exports, while 
Australia is China's sixth largest trading partner. China is Australia’s second largest inbound 
tourist market after New Zealand, and the largest total expenditure market.  Air transport 
between Australia and China has experienced a phenomenal growth in the last 10 years, with 
more direct flights launched between the two countries. In December 2016, an open skies 
arrangement was concluded between the two nations, which removed all capacity restrictions 
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between Australia and China for each country’s airlines. Zhu et al. (2019a) report that in 
2005, only Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou had direct flights to Australia’s Sydney and 
Melbourne and most Chinese travellers used Hong Kong, Singapore and even Seoul as a 
transfer point to Australia. However, in 2016, seven Chinese airlines served the China-
Australia market — from China’s 10 first-and second-cities to Australia’s major capital 
cities.  
In 2016 China Southern was the largest contributor (38%) to the direct connectivity between 
China and Australia, followed by China Eastern’s 21.8% and Air China’s 18.6%. Qantas only 
made a contribution of 6.2% (Zhu et al., 2019a). Guangzhou has forged its status as a 
significant transfer hub between Australia and China thanks to China Southern’s contribution. 
China Southern started to increase its flight routes to Australia from Guangzhou from 2009. 
In 2012, China Southern signed a strategic cooperation agreement with Tourism Australia to 
build the ‘Canton Route’ — the route link Europe, and Australia via Guangzhou. It has since 
then launched non-stop services to all major Australian capital cities from China, including 
Adelaide, Brisbane and Perth. Apart from increasing frequency and destination to the 
Australia market, China Southern has worked with Guangzhou Immigration and Customs to 
simplify the transfer procedure and launched ‘through check-in’ service in 2012, which 
means that the transit passengers do not need to reclaim their baggage at Guangzhou Airport 
for customs clearance, no matter they travel out of or into China. In addition, China Southern 
provides transit passengers with free transit lounge services if the transit time exceeds four 
hours. In 2012, the number of transit passengers using the ‘through check-in’ service 
increased was 458, 000 while in 2016, this number increased to 1.74 million. Table 6 gives 
the annual flights between China and Australia by China’s big three.  
Table 6 Annual flights between China and Australian in selected years 2007-2017 
Airline 




620 652 2476 3236 3428 4800 
Air China  
696 1048 1400 1412 1576 2000 
China 
Eastern 




Oum and Lee (2002) discussed the possibility of creating open skies in Northeast Asia and 
identified many obstacles. The reluctance of the state-owned carriers was one. However, 
more than decade on, most of the obstacles have changed or disappeared. The benefits of the 
open skies and the single aviation market examples have been observed and accepted by 
many governments and consumers, which makes the conclusion of an open skies zone in 
Northeast Asia more possible than in the early 2000s. Liu and Oum (2018) note that the rapid 
growth of China’s big three has conferred them with the opportunity to play a leadership role 
in the world air transport sector.  
There have been regular meetings among the aviation authorities of the three Northeast Asian 
economies. Open skies arrangements have also been implemented between Chinese Shandong 
province and Korea since 2006. China and Japan reached an open skies deal in 2012 but this 
deal excludes flights to/from Beijing, Shanghai, Tokyo Haneda and Tokyo Narita. In 2019, 
China and Korea sighed expanded bilateral air services MoU to add 14 weekly flights between 
Beijing and Seoul to support Beijing Daxing International Airport that is to be open in later 
2019. Korea is keen to pursue an open skies deal in this region, given its relatively small 
domestic market and its close cultural and economic links with China and Japan. The signing 
of an Open Skies agreement between Japan and the Korea in 2007 has lifted restrictions on 
frequency, capacity and destinations, with the exception of the congested Tokyo airports, 
covering both cargo and passenger services. The number of flights to and from China operated 
by the major carriers in Northeast Asia is shown in Table 7.  
As can be seen from the table, Air China and China Eastern recorded a decrease in the number 
of flights between China and Korea. Although one may argue that it is possible that these 
airlines may have used larger aircraft and thus reduced the frequency. A closer look reveals 
that the types of aircraft used have been quite consistent. Interestingly, Korea’s two major 
airline had substantial increases in the number of flights in the China-Korea market. In the 
China-Japan market, China’s big three reported a steady increase while Japan Airlines showed 
a decreasing trend in the number of flights. Therefore, for any liberal arrangements, there will 
always be winners and losers. However, Table 7 shows that all the major airlines put a 
significant amount of capacity in the Northeast Asia market compared to other markets. Such 
a significant market implies that the benefit of open skies or a single aviation market is likely 
significant.     
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8432 7016 7040 4952 8104 8888 
Korea 
9888 8276 9480 11692 14800 12192 
Korean 
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14504 14352 15652 18064 19752 19884 
Asiana Korea 
15532 15636 18164 20164 21416 20272 
Japan 
Airlines Japan 
14400 13924 8456 8680 8848 9408 
ANA Japan 
12488 12016 12280 13664 14216 16688 
 
Oum and Lee (2002) argue that, even in a bilateral negotiation, it is difficult to achieve air 
transport liberalisation unless the flag carriers of both countries are equally strong and 
competitive. Table 7 shows that the major carriers in the three countries do not differ much in 
terms of presence in the Northeast Asia markets. Therefore, it might be the right time now for 
the three countries to seriously consider creating an open skies zone in this region.  
In 2009, CAAC introduced the one route one Chinese carrier policy on the long-haul 
international routes to prevent cut-throat completion between Chinese carriers, particularly 
during the economic downturn. The long-haul routes refer to those with a distance of more 
than 4500 km and are mainly the routes from China to the US and Europe. In 2018, the policy 
was revised in the advent of the opening of the second international airport in Beijing and at a 
time when more and more Chinese could afford overseas travel and Chinese carriers had 
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increasing interests in opening new international routes. The new Measures on International 
Traffic Rights Resource Allocation and Use aims to establish a sound, open, fair and just 
management system for international traffic rights resource allocation and use.  
The new Measures divide international routes into two classes. Class 1 air routes are those 
from China to countries with open skies or partial open skies agreements. These countries 
include ASEAN countries, Australian, Chile, Maldives, Georgia, the US, the UK, New 
Zealand, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden. For Class 1 routes, there are no restrictions on the 
number of designated carriers, flight schedules, frequency, and transport capacity. Class 2 
international air routes are the markets with no liberal bilateral arrangement which are 
divided into long-haul Class 2 international air routes and non-long-haul Class 2 international 
air routes. Routes to the US, Europe (excluding Russia), Oceania and Africa are long-haul 
Class 2 international routes. A competition mechanism will apply for those (including new 
entrants) that want to fly on these routes. That is, a point system will be used be decide who 
will be the winners among the applicants. Other routes are called non-long-haul Class 2 
international routes and there is no limit on the number of designations. This policy has 
drawn wide attention and sparked much discussion as it represents a new milestone of 
China’s international air transport. The implementation of this policy will undoubtedly 
increase competition and drive down prices on some long-haul international routes. 
4. Conclusion  
There is no double that China will overtake the US to be the largest aviation market in the 
near future thanks to the rapid growth of China’ domestic and international aviation market. 
Deregulation or liberalisation measures after 2003 has contributed to this outcome. The 
liberalisation moves include the introduction of private capital into China’s air transport, 
leading to the two waves of the establishment of private carriers and LCCs in 2005 and 2013, 
respectively. These new entrants, together with the emergence of HSR, put much competitive 
pressure on the air transport industry and create momentum for Chinese carriers to seek 
improvement in efficiency and competitiveness as well as new markets. In the meantime, 
China has taken a different attitude towards the liberalisation in its international air transport. 
Liberal arrangements have been made with some major markets including the US, ASEAN, 
Korea, Japan, etc. These open and liberal arraignments have given the Chinese carriers the 
room to grow and the chance to become stronger. They in turn call for more liberalisation 
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moves to allow them to participate in the provision of more international air transport 
services. 
 
However, the recent trade disputes between China and the US, and Brexit have put a cloud 
and uncertainty over the air transport sector. Worldwide demand for air freight fell 4.7 in 
April 2019 compared with the same period in previous year, and a larger fall was recorded 
among the Asia Pacific region, according to the IATA data. Law et al. (2018) also notice that 
for decades the US carriers were firm supporters for air transport liberalisation, but recently 
they asked the government to end open skies agreements with Qatar and United Arab 
Emirates to stop allowing the Gulf carriers to expand in the US market in the excuse that the 
gulf carriers received subsidies from their government and competed unfairly on the 
transatlantic route. Similar voice was also expressed in Europe. It would be interesting to 
keep a close eye on how the rise of global protectionism impact China’s air transport 
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